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I.  CIVIL LAW OF CONTRACT – GENERAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
A.  General features of codified law 
This chapter presents a brief survey of economic analyses performed on 
contractual institutions and doctrines that are specific to civil law – as opposed to 
common law – systems (see further Mackaay forthcoming). What sets civil law 
systems apart from common law systems, besides differences in vocabulary, is 
that their core rules are set out in codes drafted with the aim of covering in 
principle all relationships within the field of law they govern. All legal problems 
arising within that field are deemed to be soluble by reference to, and through 
interpretation of, one or more provisions of the Code.  
Whilst codes consolidate in their provisions the solutions found to a great 
many practical problems that have arisen over time, it would be illusory to expect 
them to provide ready-made solutions to all conceivable problems. To cope with 
novel or imperfectly foreseen problems, whilst yet maintaining the claim to 
complete coverage, the Codes need to resort to some open-ended concepts 
which can be used to fashion appropriate solutions to such problems. Good faith 
and abuse of rights are some of these concepts. 
One of the main objectives of codification in civilian legal systems is to make 
law accessible: all the law for a given field is in principle to be found in one place 
– the Code – rather than in a proliferation of individual judicial decisions, so as to 
help citizens to know their rights and obligations. To accomplish this, the codes 
need to be of workable dimensions. The formulas used will have to be concise 
and often abstract, condensing large ranges of practical solutions, and the code’s 
provisions should be interpreted so as to form a coherent and seamless whole. 
One should not be misled by the abstract character of Code provisions or by the 
idea of the Code as a system. Codes are not systems of abstract logic 
unconnected with the real world; they are meant to reflect consolidated 
experience. To work effectively with such tools, civil lawyers need to be (made) 
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aware of the variety of actual cases each code article is meant to capture as 
much as common lawyers need to be cognizant of all the judicial decisions on a 
particular point of law. 
Once these general characteristics are taken into consideration, the 
economic analysis of law should have as much to tell lawyers in civil law systems 
as it has those in common law systems, and in the American legal system in 
particular. The Legal Origins movement has put forth the thesis that common law 
systems are more conducive to economic growth than civil law systems (La 
Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2008), but this conclusion has been contested (Dam 
2006; Roe 2006; Milhaupt/Pistor 2008; survey: Mackaay 2009) and a very recent 
paper has highlighted how the imposition of the institutions of the French 
Revolution, including its civil code, on other European nations helped to clear 
rent-seeking barriers to trade (Acemoglu et al. 2009). On the whole, the jury 
seems to be still out on the comparative virtues of different legal families. 
In what follows we look at a smattering of civil law institutions through the lens 
of the economic analysis of law. 
B.  The role of contract law 
On an economic view, contract is an open-ended institution by which 
individual actors can exchange resources to their mutual advantage, thereby 
moving them to higher-valued uses. In the consensualist conception of contract, 
parties can do this essentially in any form they see fit. What then is the role of 
contract law? Parties need no encouragement to enter into profitable deals. But 
the law may be called upon to avoid mishaps in the contracting process or 
reduce their seriousness: for instance, one party being taken advantage of by the 
other, at the time of contracting or later, as a result of unforeseen circumstances; 
or a division of tasks or risks between the parties which experience suggests is 
less than optimal. 
The first defence against mishaps falls to the parties themselves. Economic 
theory predicts that to avoid mishaps in the contracting process each party, being 
a rational actor, will take all precautions whose cost is lower than the trouble so 
avoided, discounted by the probability of its occurrence. This is the logic of 
accident avoidance, which forms the basis of the economic analysis of civil 
liability law. The idea can be expressed equivalently as each party seeking to 
minimise the sum of the costs of precautions it takes to prevent mishaps and 
those of the mishaps that it could not profitably prevent and hence must simply 
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absorb. Rational actors will only enter into a contract if these transaction costs 
are more than offset by the gains of the contract. 
Both parties will seek the optimal set-up from their own point of view. They 
will inform themselves on the prospective contracting partner, on the product 
contemplated and on the terms on which it is offered. If the information collected 
on prospective contracting partners is too sketchy for comfort, a party may limit 
dealings to a smaller circle of people on which more information can be gleaned 
or who particularly inspire confidence, for instance because of ethnic ties. Where 
the performance of a contract looks uncertain, a party may insist on being given 
security or a guarantor or again an express warranty that the product will meet 
specific requirements. Providing securities or suretyship entails of course a cost, 
which must be covered by the gains the party providing them expects to realise 
by the contract. If these or similar precautions are not viable or too costly, given 
what is at stake, or if they leave too high a margin of residual risk of mishap, a 
party may take the ultimate precaution not to contract at all. This entails the 
opportunity cost of the net gains of the contract foregone, which, one may 
surmise, the abstaining party considers to be negative. 
During their negotiations, parties may further reduce the risk of mishaps or 
non-optimal arrangements by exchanging information and shifting burdens or 
risks between them, allocating them to the one that can take care of them at the 
lowest cost. When you order a book at Amazon, they will look after the shipping, 
even though you pay for it: Amazon has access to very considerable scale 
economies in these matters. 
Parties arrive thus at the best arrangement they can fashion between 
themselves. This may still leave a substantial margin of risks of mishaps and a 
considerable level of precautions to avoid them. Can contract law improve upon 
this, leading parties to ‘lower their guard’? 
Corrective intervention through contract law would seem justified whenever 
the cost of the intervention is more than offset by the savings in transaction costs 
it generates compared to what the contracting parties could themselves achieve, 
in other words whenever it allows parties so to lower their guard that their 
savings are greater than the cost of the measure itself. Wittman states this idea 
by the simple formula that  
‘[i]n a nutshell, the role of contract law is to minimize the cost of the 
parties writing contracts + the costs of the courts writing contracts + 
the cost of inefficient behavior arising from poorly written or incomplete 
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contracts.’ (Wittman 2006, 194) 
Contract law aims at minimising the overall cost of mishaps and their 
prevention in contract. 
Of the three terms of the Wittman test, the first and the third have already 
been highlighted in the discussion of the role of contracting parties, with the 
difference that they are here to be taken at the level of society as a whole, for all 
contracting parties together. The first term refers to measures taken by the 
parties themselves, individually and in negotiation, to find the best arrangement – 
for instance in allocating risks or other burdens – and to avoid bad surprises. The 
third term refers to mishaps that the parties have been unable to avoid, that is 
arrangements that contrary to expectations turn out to be non-optimal or bad 
surprises that looked too costly to prevent beforehand and whose cost must be 
absorbed, for instance the opportunistic exploitation of a gap left in the contract. 
The middle term indicates that public intervention is worthwhile if it reduces 
the sum of the three terms, that is if its own cost is lower than the savings to 
which it gives rise in the other two terms. These considerations apply to all 
contracting parties taken together, rather than at their individual level. 
Consider, by way of example, the court system allowing contracts to be 
enforced. In the absence of such a system, breach of a contract can certainly be 
punished or avoided up front, by a private system based on arbitration and 
community sanctions such as blacklisting or exclusion. In such a private set-up, 
actors only contract with persons they know or against whom community 
sanctions will be effective. Putting in place a system of public enforcement 
represents a gamble on the gains resulting from people daring to do business 
with a larger circle of persons: the gains from more numerous and more widely 
distributed contracts plus the savings in self-protection measures contracting 
parties would normally take are sufficient to offset the fixed cost of the public 
enforcement system plus the variable costs of contracting parties using its 
services. Of course, the very presence of a public enforcement system, even 
where people do not generally have recourse to it, casts its shadow on the 
temptation of contracting parties to behave opportunistically and this in itself 
represents a saving. 
To take another example, by instituting a regime of mandatory warranties in 
the sale of manufactured goods, one implicitly gambles that the savings 
generated for a large proportion of consumers in lowered self-protection and bad 
surprises avoided largely offset the losses resulting for a smaller proportion of 
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consumers of contracts that are no longer feasible or, because of the inflexibility 
of the general rule, have to be entered into on less advantageous terms than 
parties would have liked. Empirically, it may turn out that numbers are different 
from what proponents of the measure had in mind, as Priest discovered in early 
studies of mandatory warranties (Priest 1978, 1981). 
What are the costs of a legal rule? They vary depending on whether one is 
dealing with a mandatory rule (public order – parties cannot opt out of it) or with a 
suppletive or default rule (parties may agree otherwise). A public order rule 
seeks to counter opportunism; by providing a fixed and enforceable rule, it is 
designed to allow a substantial proportion of citizens to lower the level of self-
protection they consider required in given circumstances, but at the cost of 
reducing the negotiation space for all, which will particularly hamper those who 
were willing to assume greater risk in exchange for more advantageous terms, 
especially price. 
The costs of a public order or mandatory rule (ius imperativum) include: 
1. the cost of framing the rule legislatively or judicially, including the risk of 
capture by interest groups (rent-seeking) in the case of the political 
process;  
2. the cost for the parties of enforcing their rights using public procedures the 
rule points to;  
3. the opportunity cost of ‘sharper deals’ foregone because they are 
prohibited by the rule;  
4. the cost of the rule turning out on experience to be ill-suited for the 
problem it was designed to regulate. 
Taken together these costs must be more than offset by the gains the rule 
generates in terms of people ‘lowering their guard’ (reducing self-protection), 
contracting with a wider circle of persons and absorbing residual risk.  
In the case of a suppletive or default rule (ius dispositivum), the stakes are 
slightly different because parties are now free to put it aside, but must take the 
trouble (and expense) of doing so. Essentially of the four factors listed, the third 
factor falls away under a suppletive rule. However, this may be illusory if the cost 
of opting out and framing one’s own rule is practically prohibitive, in which case 
the rule has to all intents a public order character. Since citizens are free to opt 
out, the fourth factor should now be called ‘undue reliance’ on a rule that turns 
out to be ill suited. Usually, default rules propose a solution that experience 
suggests parties would have chosen had they taken the time to contract about it 
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explicitly.  
Any rule that promises gains from more ample contracting and savings in 
transactions costs of private parties in excess of its own cost as just specified – 
net gains, in other words – has a proper place in the law of contract; the Wittman 
test implies that where several competing rules are conceivable for the same 
subject matter, the one promising the highest net gain should have preference. 
One must expect such gains where public authorities have access to greater 
scale economies in framing and enforcing rules than are open to private actors. 
A broad principle reflected in many rules is to attribute a burden to the party who 
can best or most cheaply influence the occurrence or cost of a mishap. Calabresi 
has proposed the term ‘cheapest cost avoider’ for this principle (Calabresi 1970, 
139 f.; Calabresi/Melamed 1972, 1118 f.). A good deal of civil contract law 
appears explicable as applications of the ‘cheapest cost avoider’ principle (De 
Geest et al. 2002). 
The Wittman test would seem to account for more detailed objectives of 
contract law listed in the literature, such as preventing opportunism, interpolating 
efficient terms either on a wholesale or a retail basis (gap-filling versus ad hoc 
interpretation), punishing avoidable mistakes in the contracting process, 
allocating risk to the superior risk bearer and reducing the costs of resolving 
dispute (Posner 2007, 99). 
C.  Good faith 
Good faith is a key principle in civil legal systems (survey: Litvinoff 1997; 
Hesselink 2004). It played a major role in late Roman law and in pre-codification 
French law (Charpentier 1996). Within the modern civil law family, it still plays an 
important role in French law (arts 1134 and 1135 CCF in particular) and a central 
role in German civil law (‘Treu und Glauben’ Art. 242 BGB). In Dutch law, the 
recodification towards the end of the twentieth century recognised as 
fundamental principles of civil law the subjective notion of good faith as justifiable 
ignorance of title defects in the law of property, and the objective notion of good 
faith as loyalty in contractual dealings, for which the distinctive term 
‘reasonableness and equity’ (redelijkheid en billijkheid) was introduced 
(Haanappel/Mackaay 1990). The Quebec Civil Code of 1994 has given good 
faith a substantially larger place than it had under the old Code of 1866. In all, 86 
articles in the new code use the term good faith. Amongst these, the following 
stand out:  
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6. Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good faith.  
7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an 
excessive and unreasonable manner which is contrary to the 
requirements of good faith.  
1375. The parties shall conduct themselves in good faith both at the time 
the obligation is created and at the time it is performed or extinguished.  
The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts of 1994 provide 
in art. 1.7 that ‘each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing 
in international trade’ and that ‘the parties may not exclude or limit this 
duty.’(Unidroit 1994)  
In what follows we deal only with contractual good faith, leaving aside good 
faith in property law (‘subjective good faith’), where it applies, for instance, to the 
purchaser of stolen goods and to the possessor non-owner of goods who 
acquires ownership through prescription. Good faith refers here to justifiable 
ignorance of facts or legal status, in particular defects in one’s title. This notion, 
too, lends itself to an economic analysis, in which one compares the precautions 
that could have been taken to ascertain the accurate state of affairs to the risk 
and cost of acting on an erroneous assessment (Mackaay 2001). 
To capture the meaning of good faith in contract law (‘objective good faith’), 
legal scholarship resorts to terms such as ‘fairness, fair conduct, reasonable 
standards of fair dealing, decency, reasonableness, decent behavior, a common 
ethical sense, a spirit of solidarity, community standards of fairness' and 'honesty 
in fact’ (Keily (1999), at 17-18) and their French equivalents: ‘loyauté’ 
(Charpentier 1996), at 305), ‘honnêteté’, ‘intégrité’’ (Pineau et al. 2001, at 35), 
‘fidélité’, ‘droiture’, ‘véracité’ (Rolland 1996, at 381), ‘comportement loyal’, ‘souci 
de coopération’, ‘absence de mauvaise volonté’, ‘absence d’intention 
malveillante’ (Cornu 2000, Vo Bonne foi ); the absence of good faith signals 
‘unconscionable’ behaviour (Keily 1999, at 17), which in French is characterised 
as ‘blâmable’, ‘choquant’, ‘déraisonnable’ (Pineau et al. 2001, 44). In pre-
revolutionary French law, good faith was considered to require ‘that consent is 
valid, that parties abstain from trickery, violence, any dishonesty or fraud; but 
also that it was plausible and reasonable; and finally that the contract not be 
contrary to divine law, to good morals, nor to the ‘common weal’ (profit commun)’ 
(Ourliac/de Malafosse (1969), at 83, no 67). 
All these formulae, intuitively plausible though they may seem, merely 
translate one general term into other general terms. A formula closer to 
translation into operational tests is given by Pineau et al.: ‘one should not profit 
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from the inexperience or vulnerability of other persons to impose on them 
draconian terms, to squeeze out advantages which do not correspond to what 
one gives them’ (Pineau et al. 2001, at 44). This points to the concept of 
opportunism, which in a law-and economics perspective contract law is thought 
to have a general mission to prevent (for instance Posner 2007, 99). Let us take 
a closer look at this concept. 
Opportunism is regularly mentioned in the economic literature. Specific forms 
of it have attracted a good deal of attention:  
• free riding – where a result can be brought about only by the 
contribution of all but it is not feasible to supervise everyone, the free 
rider abstains from contributing, yet shares in the spoils; (de Jasay 
1989) 
• shirking in a labour relationship, where the employee gives the 
employer a lesser performance than promised (Buechtemann/Walwei 
1999, at 172);  
• agency problems also reflect supervision difficulties – where one must 
pursue one’s plans by relying on other persons’ good offices without 
being able to fully supervise them, the other persons may pursue their 
own interests at one’s expense;  
• moral hazard – originally in insurance contracts, but with wider 
application – is also a supervision problem – where the insured, once 
the insurance contract is written, behaves less carefully than promised 
or demonstrated when the premium was set.  
• holdout behaviour is a different kind of opportunism – where a 
collective project will go forward only with everyone’s consent, the 
hold-out suspends his consent in the hope of securing more than his 
proportional share of the spoils. The opportunism stems here not from 
an information (supervision) problem, but from the monopoly power 
conferred by the veto; 
• hold-up situations are those in which one party is able to force the 
hand of the other to get more than its promised or fair share of the 
joints gains of the contract (Shavell 2007). 
Although these specific forms of opportunism have attracted a good deal of 
attention, one would be hard put to find a proper definition of opportunism in 
general (Cohen 1992, at 954). Classical economic theory paid little attention to 
the notions of transaction costs and opportunism, preferring to study markets as 
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if transactions occurred in principle without friction. In contrast, for so-called 
“institutionalist” economists, these notions play a central role, often in specific 
reference to the Coase Theorem. Williamson, who has done much to clarify the 
concept in economic thought, defines it as ‘self-interest seeking with 
guile.’(Williamson 1975, 26 and later works: 1985 and 1996). He contrasts 
opportunism with trust and associates it with selective or partial disclosure of 
information and with ‘self-disbelieved promises’ about one’s own future conduct. 
Dixit adds that it refers to a class of actions that may look tempting to individuals 
but will harm the group as a whole (Dixit 2004, 1). George Cohen defines 
opportunistic behaviour in general as ‘any contractual conduct by one party 
contrary to the other party's reasonable expectations based on the parties' 
agreement, contractual norms, or conventional morality.’ (Cohen 1992, at 957) 
To sum up, a party to a contract may be said to act opportunistically where it 
seeks, by stealth or by force, to change to its advantage and to the detriment of 
the other party or parties the division of the contract’s joint gains that each party 
could normally look forward to at the time of contracting. It tries, in other words, 
to get ‘more than its share.’ Opportunism may involve getting a party to enter an 
agreement it would not willingly have signed if it had been fully informed (ex-ante 
opportunism); it may also involve later exploiting unforeseen circumstances the 
contract does not provide for in order to change the division of gains implicitly 
agreed upon when the contract was entered into (ex-post opportunism). In acting 
opportunistically one party significantly exploits an asymmetry in the relationship 
amongst the parties to the detriment of the other party or parties. In a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, it would correspond to defection where the other party would 
choose cooperation. 
For opportunism to arise, there must be an asymmetry between the parties, 
of which one takes advantage at the expense of the other. Asymmetry itself does 
not signal opportunism: you rely on professionals of various sorts for services 
they specialise in; life would be difficult without it. Opportunism corresponds to 
the legal concept of bad faith; it is the exact opposite of good faith, which we can 
now define as not turning to one’s advantage the vulnerabilities of the other 
person in circumstances that might lend themselves to it. 
Not all forms of opportunism call for public corrective intervention. According 
to the Wittman test, intervention would not be worthwhile for minor forms, which 
are best dealt with by persons being normally on their guard: self-protection is 
cheaper than the constraints a public mandatory rule inevitably imposes on all 
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actors. The law makes opportunism actionable only where one party takes 
advantage of an asymmetry to a significant degree, i.e beyond a certain 
threshold of seriousness. This explains why puffing and minor exaggerations 
(bonus dolus) are not actionable. The impediments to the functioning of markets 
would seem here to exceed savings in self-protection. 
In a very general sense, one might say that the core of contract law is that all 
contracts must be performed in good faith and that the task of the courts is to 
sanction the absence of it. But this would leave far too much discretion to the 
courts and too much uncertainty for citizens. Hence good faith has had to be 
particularised in Civil Codes into a number of more specific concepts, each with 
its own legal tests. Whittaker and Zimmerman provide the following list for civilian 
systems: culpa in contrahendo; obligations d'information; laesio enormis; the 
abuse of rights; personal bar; interpretation of the parties' intentions (whether 
standard or 'supplementary'); the doctrine of 'lawful contact'; laches; 
unconscionability; Verwirkung; purgatio morae and purgatio poenae; doctrines of 
change of circumstances or 'erroneous presuppositions'; the notion of a 'burden' 
(Obliegenheit); force majeure; exceptio doli; mutual mistake; liability for latent 
defects; the legal consequences associated with the maxims nemo auditor 
turpitudinem suam allegans and dolo agit qui petit quod statim redditurus est; 
and venire contra factum proprium.’ (Whittaker/Zimmerman 2000, at 676; also 
Zimmerman 2001, 172). Since all these concepts are derivative of good faith, 
one would expect the three general features – asymmetry; exploitation; beyond a 
certain threshold – identified above to shine through all particularisations 
(Mackaay/Leblanc 2003). Good faith remains as a residual concept with which to 
fashion new remedies where no existing one is appropriate (as one may expect 
for some cyberspace contracts). 
II.  FORMATION 
Under the heading of the formation of contract, civil law doctrine traditionally 
deals not only with the modalities of consent through offer and acceptance, and 
other basic requirements of contract such as a legitimate cause and object, but 
also with defects of consent – error, fraud (dolus), violence or threat, as well as 
lesion – whose presence is analysed as having undermined the contract from the 
outset and hence requiring the parties to put each other back in the situation they 
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had before entering into the agreement. 
A.  Offer of reward 
You offer a reward for the return of your cat. Should you be bound to pay the 
reward even if the person returning the cat did not know of the offer? Some 
persons – active searchers -– may be induced to search by the prospect of the 
reward; casual finders may return the property if they happen upon it, on the off 
chance of a reward. The relevant question is how a rule requiring knowledge will 
affect the two groups: it will encourage active searchers, but may discourage 
casual finders; one may expect the latter group to be more numerous than the 
former; but the former group may react more strongly to the incentive of reward 
than the latter. A priori the net effect of a rule requiring knowledge is not obvious; 
it may be a wash. Given the uncertainty, a rule requiring knowledge reduces the 
number of claims that could reach the courts, but knowledge may be difficult to 
prove. By contrast, a public offer of reward may be easier to prove, which would 
militate in favour of a rule making the reward due once it was publicly offered, 
whether or not the finder had knowledge of it. The German Civil Code adopts the 
latter rule in art. 657, as does the Quebec Civil Code in art. 1395: 
The offer of a reward made to anyone who performs a particular act 
is deemed to be accepted and is binding on the offeror when the 
act is performed, even if the person who performs the act does not 
know of the offer, unless, in cases which admit of it, the offer was 
previously revoked expressly and adequately by the offeror. 
The Dutch Civil Code provides in art. 5:10 that the finder is entitled to a 
reasonable reward. 
B.  Defects of consent 
In a strictly formalist system, such as Roman law was, there would be little 
need for correcting regretted decisions. The formalities would ensure well-
considered decisions and exclude ill-advised ones as well as subtle fraud and 
violence. Prospectively all parties expect to benefit by the projected transaction. 
Criminal law would take care of cases of outright fraud and violence. 
Why abandon formalism? Because it also entails important costs: it increases 
transaction costs; it limits the range of acceptable contracts. This would slow 
down markets and may deprive us of innovations the gains of which, taken over 
all contracts, will surely suffice to offset a few regretted decisions. Modern legal 
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systems rather bet on innovation and hence go by the principle of 
consensualism, both as to the variety of contracts that can validly be entered into 
– an open set – and as to the absence of formalism for doing so. 
Within the consensualist conception of contract one needs correctives for 
cases where consent is obviously not enlightened (error and fraud) or free (threat 
of violence). The correctives one finds in the codes of civil law systems plausibly 
pass the Wittman test, in that they reduce the precautions the majority of 
contracting parties might otherwise feel compelled to adopt, whilst not unduly 
restricting the range of sharp deals some parties might contemplate. 
1.  ERROR  
For a contract to produce a Pareto gain, each of the parties must, at least 
prospectively, expect to benefit by it. This expectation can only be realistic if the 
parties are abreast of the essential stakes of the projected contract. Should they 
be mistaken about them, the contract may not lead to a Pareto gain. 
Civil law systems deal with this matter under the heading of error. Where the 
error is the result of information having been trafficked by the other party or 
under its control the special rules of fraud apply because of the opportunism that 
is clearly involved here. 
In setting up rules dealing with mere mistakes, two pitfalls are to be avoided. 
In refusing to recognise an error, one would sanctify a relationship that does not 
create a Pareto gain and one needs to consider the incentive effect that will have 
on the errans: lots of precaution next time round; this is costly and slows down 
markets. If the law is to pursue welfare enhancements in private relationships, 
the contract better be redone. Conversely, were undoing a contract for alleged 
error to become too easy, legal certainty would be undermined: a purchaser will 
hesitate to undertake further transactions with the merchandise just bought if it 
may have to be returned to the seller; third persons may hesitate to buy it for the 
same reason. A seller cannot count on the profit made in a sale that the 
purchaser could easily undo. All of this slows down market operations. 
The law draws the line between these opposite forces by providing that only 
an error concerning the essentials is a cause for the contract to be called into 
question (1400 CCQ). Essentials are considerations such that had a party been 
properly informed of them, it would not have contracted at all or only on different 
terms. That party does not stand to benefit by the contract as it is. 
The essentials cover first of all the very nature of the operation (sale or lease) 
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and the object (the house with or without its furnishings). Where one or both 
parties are mistaken about these elements, the contract is deemed not even to 
have come into existence. Parties are thus deprived of their preferred option and 
given an incentive to complete their negotiations. 
A party may demand the nullity of the contract on the ground of error, where it 
is unilaterally mistaken about an essential element of the contract, which was 
decisive for its consent (1110 CCF). This may concern the object (could the 
horse purchased be used for horse races?) or the person performing the 
contract. In either case, the other party must have been apprised of the 
importance of these factors in the course of the negotiations leading up to the 
agreement. Where the other party was not made aware, the contract goes 
forward. This gives the mistaken party an incentive to be quite clear about the 
features of the object it considers essential. 
Where the essential nature of the factor about which one party is mistaken is 
not in question, that party is given the option of demanding the nullity of the 
contract or going through with it anyway (relative nullity). By its decision, the 
party signals whether it expects or not to gain by the contract as is. The other 
party, running the risk of being deprived of its preferred option (i.e. the contract 
does not go forward as is), has an interest in making sure that its opposite is 
properly informed about any feature flagged as essential. 
Other mistakes – about the profitability of the object or minor features, for 
instance – are deemed inexcusable and do not call into question the validity of 
the contract. The mistaken party, being deprived of its preferred option, is given 
an incentive to look after these itself. It is the cheapest cost avoider for these. 
This also holds for inexcusable errors, i.e. those for which the mistaken party has 
been negligent in not taken cost-justified precautions of checking, considering 
what was at stake. The opposite rule would invite moral hazard on its part. 
2.  FRAUD 
Fraud or dolus consists in one party’s manipulating by trickery or by lies the 
information on which the other bases its consent. It is an example of 
opportunistic behaviour. Any error based on fraud is deemed excusable and it is 
open to the mistaken party to call for the nullity of the contract, even where it 
concerns the profitability of the object sold or the reason for contracting. 
Economically the opportunist is deemed always to be the cheapest cost avoider. 
Classical examples of fraud are the used car seller turning back the odometer 
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of cars to give the false impression that they have been used less than they 
really have; a seller of immoveable property hiding the fact that the projected 
enlargement of an existing road will eat away part of the land to be sold, the fact 
that a well on the property does not provide drinkable water or that an order 
prohibiting habitation has been issued against the property (All real French 
cases: Civ. 19 janvier 1977, Bull. civ., I, no 40, p. 30; Civ. 13 février 1967, Bull. 
civ. I, no 58; Civ. 10 février 1999, Contrats Conc. Consom. 1999, no 90; Civ. 29 
nov. 2000, Bull. civ. III, no 182, p. 127). 
Until recently, accepted wisdom had it that only active behaviour or 
misrepresentation could constitute fraud; simply keeping silent could not. It would 
fall to each party to inform itself about all factors it deemed important and about 
which the other had not provided information. Over the past half century, French 
law and other civil law systems have moved to the position that it may be 
fraudulent to keep silent about an element which is clearly of interest to the other 
party but about which it appears to be ill-informed. The new rule has initially 
found acceptance in the context of a relationship of trust between the parties. It 
was then generalised to réticence dolosive, consciously keeping silent, thereby 
failing to correct the other party’s misapprehensions. This extension appears to 
be a remedy complementary to the duty to inform the other party about the 
essential elements of the projected contract. 
Art work raises the trickiest problems. It may be interesting to examine by 
way of illustration a few key cases the French courts have had to deal with.  
THE POUSSIN CASE. This lengthy saga stretches over the period form 1968 till 
the final decision in 1983 (Civ. 1er, 13 décembre 1983, Bull. civ. I, no 293, and 
comments by Fabre-Magnan Muriel, Les obligations, Paris, Presses 
universitaires de France, 2004, nos 108 s., p. 273 s). In 1968, a couple decides 
to sell a painting they own and to this end have it examined by an expert, who 
attributes it to the Carrache School (end of the 16th c.), but not to its most famous 
representative, Nicolas Poussin. Armed with this assessment, they hand over the 
painting to be auctioned and it fetches 2 200 FF on 21 February 1968. At the end 
of the auction, the National Museum Association exercises its right to pre-empt 
the designated buyer and take over the painting – presumably in the national 
interest – at the price agreed to by the buyer. The painting resurfaces after 
restoration at the Louvre as a true Poussin, worth several million francs.  
The frustrated couple sue to have the initial sale annulled on the ground of 
error about an essential quality of the object sold. The courts of first instance and 
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of appeal dismiss the case, but the highest jurisdiction in France, the Cour de 
cassation, found in favour of the couple, sending the case back to a different 
court of appeal for the purpose of determining whether the couple’s consent 
might have been vitiated by the conviction that the painting could not possibly be 
a Poussin. Unfounded certainty can be a ground for error. It should be added 
that there had been numerous instances of counterfeit paintings attributed to 
Poussin, so the question was of considerable practical importance. 
The second court of appeal found that error needed to be gauged according 
to the information available at the time it was made; yet here all relevant 
information came to light after the couple made their mistake. This new decision 
was once more taken up to the Cour de cassation and once more reversed, with 
the court ruling that subsequent information could be used to establish the true 
state of affairs at the time of sale and to reach a finding of error. 
The rule that flows from this saga appears to fly in the face of the incentive 
logic holding that experts should be able to capitalise on their specialised 
knowledge by benefitting from the increased value that results from the true 
nature of the object becoming known. The rule would discourage the discovery 
and bringing to market of hidden treasures. 
One may wonder, however, whether the quality of the buyer implicitly played 
a role in the decisions of the Cour de cassation. Where a public agency 
exercises its right to pre-empt in the national interest, one may surmise that it 
suspects an undervalued treasure. Had this hunch been made public 
beforehand, the painting would have been sold – and hence would have had to 
be pre-empted – at a much higher price, even if doubt subsisted about the true 
nature of the painting. Surely the couple would have benefitted of part of that 
increase, and the ultimate buyer, of the rest. As the case initially unfolded, all of 
the value increase benefitted the State – hence the community at large. Does the 
State need special encouragement to make money on the expertise of its 
servants in the matter of undervalued paintings? The Cour de cassation’s 
decision implicitly answered that question in the negative. One may wonder 
whether the court would have reached the same decision with respect to a 
private buyer. At all events, owners of ‘old’ paintings are alerted to the 
spectacular gains that may await them if they have the paintings evaluated. This 
may help bring hidden treasures to light. Small consolation. 
THE FRAGONARD CASE (Civ. 1er, 25 mai 1992, Bull. civ. I, no 165, JCP G 1992. 
I. 3608, 370). Most fortunately the Cour de cassation had occasion a few years 
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later to revisit the matter, but now with respect to a private buyer in otherwise 
similar circumstances. Here a private owner sold for 55,000 FF to an expert a 
painting called Le Verrou, which an expertise had attributed to the School of 
Jean-Honoré Fragonard. The expert purchaser, having restored the painting, 
recognised it as a true Fragonard and sold it to the Louvre for 5,150,000 FF. 
Once more the original seller sued for annulment of the original sale on the 
ground of error regarding an essential quality of the object of sale. The lower 
courts declared the nullity of the contract on the basis of the rule established by 
the Cour de cassation in Poussin, but the court itself reversed that decision on 
the ground that the expert’s work had conferred upon the original seller an 
unjustified enrichment, which should be taken into account. Upon referral, 
1,500,000 FF were awarded to the expert and the Cour de cassation left that 
decision undisturbed.  
Are the incentives better aligned this time? Some commentators observed 
that the new rule discourages risk-taking by experts and indeed investment in 
acquiring expert knowledge in the first place. Hidden treasures would remain 
hidden. Need one be that pessimistic? After all, the decision confers a 
substantial portion of the value increase to the expert as well as to the initial 
owner. It appears to give signals to both of them, to the owners to have their art 
work evaluated and (perhaps) brought to market; to the expert to spot 
undervalued treasures, since they would be rewarded according to the value 
they unearth; it would have been disastrous indeed to reward the expert 
according to the time spent examining and restoring the painting. Altogether it 
would seem that the rule gives incentives for entrepreneurial behaviour to both 
parties involved, somewhat like what the Code does in the case of the discovery 
of buried treasures on someone else’s land: splitting the gains half-half (716 
CCF; 938 CCQ; 5:13 NBW). 
THE BALDUS PHOTOGRAPHS CASE (CIV 1E, 3 MAI 2000, BULL. CIV. I, NO 131, D. 
2000. IR. 169, JCP G 2001. II. 10510, NOTE C. JAMIN). The rules developed by the 
French supreme jurisdiction do not mean that sellers can in all circumstances 
recover part of the value increase occurring after the sale as a result of 
circumstances of which they were unaware at the time of sale. This is nicely 
illustrated by the Baldus photographs case. In 1986, a woman entrusts 50 
photographs of Baldus – one of the earliest photographers to make a name for 
himself in the mid-nineteenth century – to an auction house to be sold by public 
auction, for 1,000 FF per photograph. They are bought by an expert, who 
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succeeds in reselling them for a multiple of that price. In 1989, the woman 
contacts the purchaser directly to offer him a second series of Baldus 
photographs for which she sets the price again at 1,000 FF per photograph. The 
purchaser accepts, realising fully well that he can resell them for several times 
that price. Subsequently, the seller learns (finally!) that Baldus was a famous 
photographer and seeks to have the sale annulled on the ground of fraud – here 
fraudulently keeping silent – alleging that she would never have sold the 
photographs for that price had she been apprised of their true value. The courts, 
this time with approval of the Cour de cassation, dismiss the case, observing that 
the purchaser was under no duty to inform the seller, given that it was the seller 
who took the initiative of contacting the buyer and of setting the price. 
The decision has the effect of protecting experts seeking to capitalise on their 
knowledge, where they have done nothing to mislead the seller and the latter 
sought them out and set the price at which the merchandise was offered, without 
first ascertaining market value. The decision gives sellers an interest in having 
their property appraised before offering it for sale. The amount obtained in the 
first public auction – 50,000 FF – suggests that this was not an extravagant 
precaution to take. 
Altogether economic analysis of law suggests a reading of these three 
seminal cases that makes sense in terms of apportioning the various burdens 
and prospects of gain so as to give the right signals to the parties involved. 
3.  THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR FEAR 
Threats of violence or fear refers to situations of disequilibrium of forces 
between the parties, of which the stronger one opportunistically abuses to its 
own advantage by ‘twisting the arm’ of the other party or threatening to do so. It 
corresponds more or less to the common law concept of duress. A contract 
entered into as result of fear is unlikely to lead to a Pareto gain. Whilst there is an 
obvious danger of letting go forward contracts entered into under such 
circumstances, the opposite danger should also be stressed: if it is too easy to 
get out of a deal on the ground of threat of violence or fear, one may discourage 
all forms of pressure, even those that break a deadlock and lead to agreement 
conferring a gain to all parties. The Code provisions should reflect a concern to 
skirt both of these dangers. 
To be actionable, the fear brought to bear on a contracting party may stem 
from the other party or from a third person, and it should threaten a harm to the 
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person or property of that contracting party or to that of a third person, providing 
that the seriousness of the threat would be sufficient to impress a reasonable 
person, to use the formula of the French Code (1111-1115 CCF; 1402 CCQ). 
Mere respect for or awe of the other person is not sufficient to have the contract 
annulled. Moreover, annulment is refused if the victim of the threat subsequently 
approved the contract, after the threat ceased, or has let the period provided for 
restitution lapse without acting. 
Article 1404 of the Quebec Code deserves to be noted. A person who, whilst 
aware of the state of necessity of another, in good faith helps the latter to get out 
of that state need not fear that the contract by which the assistance is provided 
will be annulled on the ground of fear or violence. The opposite rule would of 
course discourage persons from providing assistance to persons in danger or 
distress. Yet it is important to prevent persons providing assistance from 
opportunistically exploiting the situation to their – excessive – advantage, since 
this would lead to excessive precautions on the part of potential victims. The use 
of the term ‘good faith’ appears designed to prevent this form of opportunism. 
4.  LESION 
Lesion is usually presented in civil law scholarship under the heading of 
defects of consent, although its nature does perhaps not quite comport with that 
qualification. Since 1994, the Quebec Code provides a definition: 
1406. Lesion results from the exploitation of one of the parties by 
the other, which creates a serious disproportion between the 
prestations of the parties; the fact that there is a serious 
disproportion creates a presumption of exploitation. (Prestation is 
civil law English for the object or service each party must render 
onto the other) 
In cases involving a minor or a protected person of full age, lesion 
may also result from an obligation that is considered to be 
excessive in view of the patrimonial situation of the person, the 
advantages he gains from the contract and the general 
circumstances. 
The difficulty, from an economic point of view, is that things have no ‘natural’ 
price. Values are essentially subjective. The very fact that something is sold 
means that it is worth more to the buyer than to the seller. Value depends on 
circumstances of time and place. The bottle of water I drink when quite thirsty 
during a hot summer day is worth much more to me than the one I drink routinely 
in the winter. The second-hand book that completes my collection of a little 
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known author is worth a lot to me, but little to the average buyer. When 
unfortunate circumstances cause me to have an urgent and unforeseen need of 
cash, I may have to let the collection go for far less than it might fetch under 
normal circumstances. 
These examples illustrate the difficulty of determining what would be a 
disproportion, serious or not, between the prestations of the parties to a contract. 
This is true as well for the test of seven twelfths of the sale price of an 
immoveable, which the French Code, in art. 1674 and following, indicates as the 
threshold beyond which a contract is deemed lesionary. 
In the absence of objective criteria, could one get a grasp of lesion by looking 
at the subjective side, i.e. factors that relate to the situation of the victim of lesion 
or the circumstances under which it is supposed to have occurred? This is no 
doubt the purpose of the term ‘exploitation’, which points to opportunism, 
discussed above. But beyond the cases of defects of consent and the general 
concept of good faith, it is difficult to see how this concept advances the 
determination of what lesion is. 
The codifiers appear to have been aware of the problem and for this reason 
have provided that as between capable adults lesion is no ground for annulment 
of a contract (1118 CCF; 1405 CCQ). Each party is considered the cheapest cost 
avoider when it comes to looking after its own interest. Lesion is recognised for 
minors and for incapable grown-ups, in which case it reflects soft paternalism 
(On paternalism see Buckley 2005). In recent consumer legislation, consumers 
appear to be treated as incapable adults. In the Quebec Consumer Protection 
Act, the legislature has deemed it wise to further clarify the concept of lesion, 
applicable to all consumer contracts, by providing that the consumer’s obligation 
must be ‘excessive, harsh or unconscionable’ (Quebec Consumer Protection Act, 
LRQ P-40.1, art. 8 and 9. http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-p-
40.1/latest/rsq-c-p-40.1.html). French consumer legislation uses the qualification 
that the act must have amounted to an abuse of the weakness or ignorance of 
the person; this appears to refer to the circumstances in which the contract was 
entered into and implicitly to extend the scope of the concepts of fraud and threat 
of violence. It is obvious that one attempts here to capture practical applications 
of the idea of opportunism. These terms do not really resolve the problem, but 
they do indicate the need to use the concept of lesion sparingly. 
Are solutions to these problems to be found in the consideration, put forth by 
researchers in the Behavioral Law-and-Economics tradition, that the average 
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observer would find unfair an agreement that significantly differs from the idea 
that person has formed of the reference transaction under similar circumstances 
(Jolls 2007)? Further research on the interface of law, economics and cognitive 
psychology will have to tell. 
C.  Cause 
In canon law, a contract could not be valid unless the prestation of either 
party constituted a valid reason for the other to enter into the contract, in other 
words if there was a fair ‘counterpart’ to one’s own prestation. If from the outset 
this cause was an illusion, the contract would be null. In common law 
consideration appears still to play a similar role: a contract will not be formed 
without valid consideration. The common law judge does not inquire into the 
actual equivalence of the prestations on both sides; the original canon law 
concept, however, invited precisely this inquiry. If one of the prestations became 
impossible, the contract would perforce be void. 
Modern civil law systems maintain the concept of cause, but without 
mandating an inquiry into the actual equivalence of the prestations, save in 
special circumstances such as lesion. Cause now refers to the existence of a 
standardised or stylised reason for a party to undertake a contractual obligation: 
the counterpart in the case of bilateral contracts; liberal intention in the case of 
gratuitous contracts. Whether the concept still serves a useful function is a moot 
point. At all events, the French and Quebec codes still maintain it (1131 CCF; 
1371, 1411 CCQ).  
III.  CONTENTS 
A.  Limitation or exclusion of liability clauses 
Clauses limiting or even excluding liability raise more clearly perhaps than 
others the spectre of opportunism: to limit liability for the consequences of one’s 
own actions opens the door to moral hazard. Of course, the market itself 
provides a first range of sanctions: loss of clientele, bad reputation, black listing, 
boycott. Nonetheless such clauses may not catch the attention of consumers at 
the time of contracting and may badly hurt some of them in individual cases. 
The codes handle the problem by providing that such clauses are in principle 
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valid, so as to allow parties to allocate risks in the best way they can come up 
with. But their validity is subject to severe restrictions reflecting the danger of 
opportunism. By way of example, the Quebec Code provides in article 1474 that 
one cannot exclude liability for physical damage done to another intentionally or 
through gross recklessness, gross carelessness or gross negligence. For bodily 
or moral injury no exclusion at all is permitted. In the particular context of sale, 
article 1732 provides that sellers may not limit warranties to exempt themselves 
of the consequences of their personal fault. To this, article 1733 adds that no 
exclusion is allowed where sellers have not disclosed defects of which they were 
aware or could not have been unaware (professionals and specialised sellers or 
manufacturers). All in all, if these and similar provisions are looked at as 
remedies against opportunism, it is striking that they are all the more severe as 
the risk of damage and of opportunism is greater. 
Traditionally, civil law doctrine held that parties could not contract out of their 
essential obligations under a given contract. The idea is reminiscent of the 
doctrine of fundamental breach in common law. In a recent case, the French 
Cour de cassation arrived at a similar result in the Chronopost case (Chronopost, 
Com. 22 Oct 1996, Bull. 1996 IV no 26; JCP G 1997. I. 4002, obs. Fabre-
Magnan; D. 1997. Jur. 121, obs. Sériaux; JCP G 1997. II. 22881, note D. Cohen; 
Gaz. Pal. 1997-08-16, no 238, p. 12, note R. Martin; Répertoire du notariat 
Defrénois, 1997-03-15, no 5, p. 333, note D. Mazeaud; JCP G 1997. 924, note 
J.K. Adom) invoking the absence of cause. Once more, an economic reading of 
the decision would point to an apparent attempt to curtail opportunism. 
B.  Penalty clauses 
A penalty clause allows parties to spell out at the time of contracting the 
amount of damages that will be due in case of non-performance or late 
performance of obligations arising under the contract. The interest of such a 
clause is to set the amount of damages without the need to prove prejudice in 
court and the risk of arbitrariness or misperception by the court assessing the 
damage. Penalty clauses should allow parties better to plan their affairs, in the 
full knowledge of their rights and obligations should they be unable to perform 
the contract as initially agreed.  
The amount the penalty clause stipulates may be an estimate of the 
anticipated damage, but may also stray away from it, either upwards or 
downwards, in the latter case amounting to a clause limiting liability for damages. 
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Where the clause sets a penalty well above the actual anticipated prejudice, it 
has a signalling function: it signals the debtor’s confidence of being able to 
perform without a hitch. In the ‘market for lemons’ story, generous warranties 
offered in sales signal higher quality wares (Akerlof 1970). For the beneficiary, it 
represents a sure way of forcing the actual performance of the contract should 
the debtor prove reluctant. For these reasons penalty clauses have a useful 
economic purpose. 
Yet penalty clauses are open to abuse: a consumer may underwrite them 
without giving it due attention and live to regret it, or the obligation of one party 
may be shrunk to virtually naught. In either case there is risk of opportunism. 
Common law traditionally distinguishes between liquidated damage clauses 
and penalty clauses. It admits the former, as a reasonable estimate of actual 
damage and saving transaction costs, but refuses the latter where the amount 
set is very different. The reasons given for the distinction should not detain us 
here; what is of interest is that the civil law traditionally did not make the 
distinction (see Mattei 1995; Hatzis 2003). From a law-and-economics point of 
view, the civil law rule allows for the signalling effect, which common law 
excludes. But what of opportunism? It is interesting to note that the matter has 
been amply discussed in the law-and-economics literature. The upshot of the 
debate is that those who would allow penalty clauses see the need for means to 
control opportunism, through such concepts as unconscionability. 
In this light, it is interesting to see an opposite trend in civil law systems. 
Whilst generally penalty clauses are valid, the courts are more and more allowed 
to moderate their severity. The French code as well as the Quebec code and the 
new Dutch code, for instance, allow the court to reduce the penalty where the 
obligation has been partially performed (1231 CCF; 1623 (2) CCQ; 6:94 
Netherlands Civil Code). Moreover the French code, in art. 1152, allows the 
court, even ex officio, to reduce or increase the penalty where it appears 
manifestly excessive or pathetic, stipulations to the contrary being void. The 
Quebec code, in article 1623, provides for the reduction of an ‘abusive’ penalty, 
using the same term as in article 1437, where it applies only to consumer 
contracts, a restriction not applicable to article 1623. No explicit provision is to be 
found in the Quebec code for increasing penalties that are manifestly 
insignificant. At most, one may surmise that the courts might arrive at that result 
by interpreting such a clause as an implicit limitation of liability clause to which 
article 1474 is applicable. 
EJAN MACKAAY – CIVIL LAW OF CONTRACT 
 24 
All in all, these provisions seem to acknowledge the incentive and signalling 
effects of penalty clauses, yet seek to control opportunism in their use. 
IV.  PERFORMANCE 
A.  Excusable non-performance: force majeure 
Force majeure refers to an event making performance impossible, which in 
terms of article 1470 of the Quebec code is both unforeseeable and irresistible, 
and lies outside the sphere of events for which the party invoking it is 
accountable (see also 1152 CCF). Where any of these characteristics is absent, 
the party in default is liable, which should give it the incentive to take precautions 
or to underwrite insurance; any other rule would create moral hazard. Where all 
three factors are present, we face an event over which the non-performing party 
cannot exert any influence and hence which it would be futile to encourage it to 
prevent. 
In the case of non-performance due to force majeure, civil law provides that 
the party prevented from performing is liberated from its obligation and does not 
owe damages. What happens then to the performance of the other party, if that 
has not become impossible? Civil law doctrine analyses the problem under the 
heading of the theory of risks. In principle, the party prevented from performing 
assumes the risk: it will be excused from performing itself, but cannot ask the 
other party to perform. The opposite rule would create moral hazard. 
In contracts that entail the transfer of ownership, the rule is different: the risk 
falls to the owner, even before delivery. In article 1456 of the new Quebec civil 
code that rule has been changed so as to transfer risk to the new owner only 
upon delivery; possession now carries with it the burden of the risks. From the 
viewpoint of the economic analysis of law, the burden seems thus to have been 
placed in each circumstance on the party that is the cheapest cost avoider. 
All of this is suppletive law – parties may contract around it. An example of 
such contracting is the clause often encountered in commercial contracts 
labelled hardship. It provides that where an important change of circumstances 
of economic or technological nature occurs that seriously disturbs the balance of 
obligations under the contract, each party may ask that the contract be 
renegotiated. The hardship clause reflects the idea of unforeseeability, which in 
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most civil law systems is not recognised as a ground for the courts to modify the 
parties’ obligations (Implicitly 1439 CCQ).  
The problem for the courts is nicely illustrated by a 19th-century American 
case, Goebel v. Linn (Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284, 41 Am. Rep. 
723 (1882). Before electricity was commonly available, cooling was provided by 
means of large blocks of ice, delivered by specialised suppliers who cut the ice at 
the end of winter and stored them in specially insulated warehouses for use 
during the summer. In November 1879, a brewer in the State of Michigan had 
contracted with such a supplier for the regular delivery of ice blocks for the 
summer of 1880. The ice was sold at $1.75 a ton, or $2.00 a ton should a 
shortage develop. The winter was unusually mild and the brewer, while there 
was still time to contract with others, took the precaution of contacting its supplier 
to make sure that the contract would be performed as agreed. The supplier 
confirmed that it did not foresee difficulties and fully expected to live up to its 
obligations. But the spring turned out to be even milder than expected, so that far 
less ice could be cut than was usual. A severe shortage developed. 
The supplier contacted the brewer in May 1880, explaining that it could only 
guarantee delivery of the ice at a price of $5 a ton. The brewer, fearing 
interruption of the ice supply with loss of a great supply of beer it had on hand, 
gave in and the parties settled on $3.50 over an eight-month period. At the end 
of that period, the supplier demanded payment under the contract; the brewer 
refused to pay the supplement, invoking duress. The court granted the action for 
payment of the full amount, ruling that the price was reasonable under the 
circumstances; that the supplier had not taken advantage of unforeseen 
circumstances to drive an unfair bargain; and that the mere threat of not standing 
by one’s initially agreed obligations did not amount to duress.  
The case has provoked a wide range of comments, stretching from 
straightforward support to disapproval as undermining business morality. Posner 
opines that if the court had heeded the brewer’s insistence on getting the ice at 
the originally agreed price, the supplier would have gone bankrupt and the 
brewer would still have had to find ice at the even higher market price. Nothing 
indicates that the supplier has opportunistically taken advantage of changed 
circumstances. He approves the result (Posner 2007, 100-101). 
Against this others have argued that the courts should not allow contracts to 
be reopened where changed circumstances give one of the parties a temporary 
monopoly with which to twist the other party’s arm. This does not mean that 
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reopening a contract should never be allowed. In the Goebel case one would 
have to know the frequency of mild winters. If they occur with some regularity, 
the supplier is best placed to assume the risk (perhaps spreading it through 
subcontracts), in which case the court should refuse retroactively to reopen the 
contract. On this view, only if mild winters were extremely rare and totally 
unforeseeable would the court’s decision be justified (Aivazian et al. 1984).  
In French civil law, some authors have detected a tendency to allow court 
revision of contract for imprevision in very exceptional circumstances. The 
ground the courts have used is that to insist in such a case on the original terms 
would go against the duty of dealing in good faith that parties owe each other. It 
will be interesting to watch whether this tendency persists and whether it draws 
the line as suggested above on the basis of economic considerations. 
B.  Contractual remedies: specific performance 
Where one party does not receive the performance to which it is entitled 
under the contract, while itself performing correctly or offering to do so, it can call 
on the full might of the law to force the hand of the recalcitrant debtor. What 
should the frustrated creditor be able to demand? At first blush it would seem 
normal to allow it to demand the prestation it was entitled to under the contract: 
specific performance. This would give it the gains it counted on in entering into 
the contract. In common law systems, however, specific performance is 
considered the exceptional remedy, the normal one being damages. This rule 
has an effect similar to that of prohibiting penalty clauses, whilst allowing 
liquidated damage clauses. 
In civil law systems, by contrast, specific performance is considered the first 
choice at the disposal of the creditor victim of non-performance (1590 and 1601 
CCQ; art. 3:296 NBW). Article 1142 of the French Code, providing that non-
performed obligations to do or not to do dissolve into damages, is considered no 
longer to reflect current law: French courts accept to order the debtor to perform, 
and to set a penalty (astreinte) for every period of time or occasion the debtor 
does not comply. The obligation to give, which means to transfer ownership, 
lends itself quite naturally to specific performance, in the sense that the judgment 
can provide the title of transfer; in the case of immoveables, judgment rendered 
upon an action in execution of title (en passation de titre) can be entered into the 
registers of real rights (3:300 NBW). The Quebec code explicitly recognises the 
sanction of specific performance, in cases which admit of it (1590 and 1601 
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CCQ). 
Since American law – the starting place of law-and-economics – admits 
specific performance only sparingly, a lively debate developed to determine 
when it actually does so and whether law-and-economics can offer a plausible 
explanation for it. An initial article by Kronman (Kronman 1978) suggested the 
matter turned on the distinction between unique goods and those for which ready 
substitutes are available in the market. For the former, specific performance 
would normally be granted, not least because the damage would be particularly 
hard to assess; for the latter market prices would be available and damages 
would routinely be granted. For services specific performance risks violating the 
personal freedom of the debtor, and for this reason only damages would be 
available for non-performance.  
The upshot of the debate that followed is usefully summarised in a paper by 
Eisenberg (Eisenberg 2005). Two fundamental principles should in his view 
govern the matter, namely the bargain principle and the indifference principle. 
According to the first principle, parties are normally the best judges of their own 
interests and hence their contract should be enforced as agreed, save special 
circumstances such as defects of consent. The second principle holds that 
remedies should be chosen and applied so as to render the victim of non-
performance indifferent between regular performance and the situation that 
obtains upon the granting of the remedy. 
Specific performance normally accords with both principles. Should it be 
granted in all circumstances? Some arguments tell against that view. The 
common law remedy of the injunction is a court order backed by the sanction of 
contempt of court, which is a criminal offence. Yet here it is applied to a private 
dispute, which seems awkward. Moreover, injunctions violate individual 
freedoms.  
A second reason for not granting specific performance in all circumstances is 
conflict with another common law principle, that of mitigation of damages by the 
victim of non-performance. Eisenberg gives the example of a municipality 
contracting for the construction of a bridge. Once the construction is underway, it 
realises that it will be unable to fund the road leading up to the bridge and 
advises the builder of its desire to cancel the project. The builder ignores the 
notice, completes the bridge and sues for payment. The municipality has no use 
for the bridge – a social waste. It would have been better to halt the project and 
indemnify the builder for costs already incurred. Completing the bridge 
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needlessly aggravates the waste. The court dismisses the action for payment. 
A third reason militating against granting specific performance across the 
board is that it opens the door to opportunism by the victims of non-performance, 
which is particularly obvious in the case of wares whose value fluctuates. If the 
value increases, the frustrated creditor of the prestation might sue for specific 
performance; should it go down, the creditor might sue for damages as these 
would be measured at the time of non-performance. 
Eisenberg’s recommendation is to accept specific performance as the regular 
sanction save in cases where it would be inappropriate. In the case of moveables 
readily available in the market, specific performance should not be granted since 
frustrated buyers can easily procure the objects elsewhere and claim the price 
difference as damages. Conversely, Eisenberg would not grant specific 
performance against the buyer of such goods, since the vendor should be 
satisfied selling to a third person and claiming the price difference, if any, from 
the initial buyer. For unique goods, for long-term contracts and for purchase and 
sale of immoveables, specific performance would be apposite in his view. In 
service contracts one may hesitate about granting specific performance where it 
interferes with individual freedom, such as cases where one would force the 
hand of a famous artist or athlete. By contrast, there is no reason not to grant it 
against an organisation, forcing it, for instance, to reinstate a person who has 
been unjustly dismissed. These rules seem close to the practices followed in 
many civil law jurisdictions. 
What do we know about how actors in the field actually choose amongst the 
various remedies? A Danish study (Lando/Rose 2004) finds that 
businesspersons rarely ask for specific performance, preferring damages 
instead. This seems to confirm the intuition that once a relationship is spoilt, 
there is little point in forcing the unwilling debtor to perform; better to claim 
damages, cut the ties and start again with different persons. Civil legal systems 
leave this choice with the victims of non-performance and it will be interesting to 
see further fieldwork on how they exercise the choice. 
CONCLUSION 
The general thesis put forth in this paper is that there is no reason to expect 
the economic analysis of law to be any less applicable to civil law systems than it 
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is to common law systems, once structural differences between the two families 
are taken into account. Civil law systems aim at bringing together all rules 
pertaining to a given field in a law code; to keep the code workable, its provisions 
have to be concise, often using rather abstract language to summarise a broad 
range of situations encountered in practice. Since codes must in principle cover 
all legal problems arising in their field, they carry an implicit ambition of being 
complete, which means that they will have to rely on some broad and open-
ended concepts such as good faith or abuse of rights to fill the gaps. To 
understand the concept of good faith it is helpful to clarify the economic concept 
of opportunism. 
In looking more closely at some civil law concepts, one discovers that matters 
having triggered discussion in common law systems, such as the desirability of 
limiting penalty clauses or specific performance, are also cause for reflection in 
civil law systems. Examination of civil law defects of consent shows 
developments and arguments that are reminiscent of common law discussions, 
with a different vocabulary. This similarity had already been highlighted in an 
Anglo-French comparative exercise (Harris/Tallon 1991). 
All in all, law and economics provides a useful tool for lawyers in civil law 
systems at a time when Europe is looking for common principles of contract and 
delictual responsibility. When one is comparing national legal systems in search 
of communalities, it offers a functional analysis in terms of which different 
national systems can, as it were, be put on a common denominator. That is an 
important asset for doctrinal analysis. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Acemoglu et al. 2009 Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson and James A. 
Robinson, The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French 
Revolution, rapport, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7245, 2009; 
(http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3951) 
Aivazian et al. 1984 Aivazian, Varouj A., Michael J. Trebilcock and Michael Penny, 
“The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a 
Bench Mark of Enforceability”, (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 173-212 
Akerlof 1970 Akerlof, George A., “The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism”, (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 488-500 
EJAN MACKAAY – CIVIL LAW OF CONTRACT 
 30 
Buckley 2005 Buckley, Frank H., Just Exchange - A Theory of Contract, 
London, Routledge, 2005 
Buechtemann/Walwei 1999 Buechtemann, Christoph F. and Ulrich Walwei, Employment 
Security Through Dismissal Protection: Market Versus Policy 
Failures, in: The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, 
Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), Aldershot, UK, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 1999, pp. 168-182 
Calabresi 1970 Calabresi, Guido, The Cost of Accidents –  A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970 
Calabresi/Melamed 1972 Calabresi, Guido and Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, 
(1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 
Charpentier 1996 Charpentier, Élise M., “Le rôle de la bonne foi dans l'élaboration 
de la théorie du contrat”, (1996) 26 Revue de droit de l'Université 
de Sherbrooke 300-320 
Cohen 1992 Cohen, George M., “The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in 
Contract Law”, (1992) 20 Hofstra Law Review 941-1016 
Cornu 2000 Cornu, Gérard (ed.), Vocabulaire juridique, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2000 
Dam 2006 Dam, Kenneth W., The Law-Growth Nexus:  The Rule of Law and 
Economic Development, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institutions 
Press, 2006 
De Geest et al. 2002 De Geest, Gerrit, Bart de Moor and Ben Depoorter, 
“Misunderstandings between Contracting Parties: Towards an 
Optimally Simple Legal Doctrine”, (2002) 9 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law   
http://www.unimaas.nl/default.asp?template=werkveld.htm&id=H
O4L47CN622C36ETJ070&taal=nl  
de Jasay 1989 de Jasay, Anthony, Social Contract, Free Ride – A Study of the 
Public Goods Problem, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989 
Dixit 2004 Dixit, Avinash K., Lawlessness and Economics - Alternative 
Modes of Governance, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2004 
Eisenberg 2005 Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, “Actual and Virtual Specific 
Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference 
Principle in Contract Law”, (2005) 93 California Law Review 975-
1050 
Haanappel/Mackaay 1990 New Netherlands Civil Code - Patrimonial Law / Le nouveau 
Code civil néerlandais - Le droit patrimonial (trilingual edition) 
(translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and Ejan Mackaay) Kluwer, 
Deventer, The Netherlands 1990 
Harris/Tallon 1991 Harris, Donald and Denis Tallon (eds), Contract Law Today: 
Anglo-French Comparisons, Oxford [1987], Clarendon Press, 
1991, (2nd ed.)  
Hatzis 2003 Hatzis, Aristides N., “Having the Cake and Eating it too: Efficient 
Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law”, (2003) 22 
International Review of Law and Economics 381–406 
EJAN MACKAAY – CIVIL LAW OF CONTRACT 
 31 
Hesselink 2004 Hesselink, Martijn W., The Concept of Good Faith, in: Towards a 
European Civil Code - Third Fully Revised and Expanded Edition, 
Arthur S. Hartkamp, Martijn W. Hesselink et al. (eds), Nijmegen, 
Ars Aequi Libri, 2004, (3rd ed.), pp. 471-498;  
Jolls 2007 Jolls, Christine, Behavioral Law and Economics, in: Behavioral 
Economics and Its Applications, Peter A. Diamond and Hannu 
Vartiainen (eds), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 
115-155 
Keily 1999 Keily, Troy, “Good Faith & the Vienna Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)”, (1999) 3 Vindobona 
Journal of International Commercial Law & Arbitration 15-40 
Kronman 1978 Kronman, Anthony T., “Specific Performance”, (1978) 45 
University of Chicago Law Review 351-382 
La Porta et al. 1998 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny, “Law and Finance”, (1998) 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113-1155 
La Porta et al. 1999 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny, “The Quality of Government”, (1999) 15 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 222-279 
La Porta et al. 2008 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 
“The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins”, (2008) 46 
Journal of Economic Literature 285–332 
Lando/Rose 2004 Lando, Henrik and Caspar Rose, “On the Enforcement of Specific 
Performance in Civil Law Countries”, (2004) 24 International 
Review of Law and Economics 473-487 
Litvinoff 1997 Litvinoff, Saul, “Good Faith”, (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 1645-
1674 
Mackaay 2001 Mackaay, Ejan, Law and Economics: What's in it for Us Civilian 
Lawyers, in: Law and Economics in civil law countries, Bruno 
Deffains and Thierry Kirat (eds), Amsterdam, JAI Press 
(Elsevier), 2001, pp. 23-41 
Mackaay/Leblanc 2003 Mackaay, Ejan and Violette Leblanc, The law and economics of 
good faith in the civil law of contract, European Association of 
Law and Economics, Nancy, France, 18-20 September 2003;  
https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/jspui/handle/1866/125  
Mackaay 2009 Mackaay, Ejan, Est-il possible d’évaluer l’efficience d’un système 
juridique ?, in: Convergence, concurrence et harmonisation des 
systèmes juridiques, Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Ejan 
Mackaay, Benoit Moore and Stéphane Rousseau (eds), 
Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 2009, pp. 21-46 
Mackaay forthcoming Mackaay, Ejan, Economic analysis of law for civilian legal 
systems, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar (forthcoming) 
Mattei 1995 Mattei, Ugo, “The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty 
Clause in Contracts”, (1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 427-444;  
Milhaupt/Pistor 2008 Milhaupt, Curtis J. and Katharina Pistor, Law & Capitalism: What 
Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic 
Development around the World, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 2008 
EJAN MACKAAY – CIVIL LAW OF CONTRACT 
 32 
Ourliac/de Malafosse 1969 Ourliac, Paul and J. de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé - 1/ Les 
obligations, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1969, (2nd 
ed.) 
Pineau et al 2001 Pineau, Jean, Danielle Burman and Serge Gaudet, Théorie des 
obligations, Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 2001 (4th ed.) 
Posner 2007 Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, New York, 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2007, (7th ed.) 
Priest 1978 Priest, George L., “Breach and Remedy for the Tender of 
Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An 
Economic Approach”, (1978) 91 Harvard Law Review 960-1001 
Priest 1981 Priest, George L., “A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty”, 
(1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1297-1352 
Roe 2006 Roe, Mark J., « Legal, Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock 
Markets », (2006) 120 Harvard Law Review 460-527 
Rolland 1996 Rolland, Louise, “La bonne foi dans le Code civil du Québec : Du 
général au particulier”, (1996) 26 Revue de droit de l'Université 
de Sherbrooke 378-399 
Shavell 2007 Shavell, Steven, “Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention”, 
(2007) 36 Journal of Legal Studies 325-354 
Unidroit 1994 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts of 1994 
English text at   
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.contract.principles.1994/doc.html 
French at http://www.unidroit.org/french/principles/contents.htm 
Whittaker/Zimmerman 2000 Whittaker, Simon and Reinhard Zimmerman, “Coming to Terms 
with Good Faith”, in: Good Faith in European Contract Law, 
Reinhard Zimmerman and Simon Whittaker (eds), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, 653-701 
Williamson 1975 Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications, New York., Free Press, 1975 
Williamson 1985 Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism - 
Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York, The Free 
Press, 1985. 
Williamson 1996 Williamson, Oliver E., The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1996 
Wittman 2006 Wittman, Donald A., Economic Foundations of Law and 
Organization, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 
Zimmerman 2001 Zimmerman, Reinhard, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, 
European Law - The Civilian Tradition Today, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001 
 
